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The Obama administration’s decision to intervene militarily in Libya has been largely 
justified on the grounds that the U.S. and its allies were compelled to do this because if 
left on his own Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi would have killed many innocent 
Libyans guilty of nothing more than wanting a better life and more freedom.  The general 
outline of this explanation is almost certainly true, but it is not entirely sufficient and 
leaves too many questions unanswered.  Answering these questions is essential for 
winning enduring public support for this action, developing a strategy for winding down 
this intervention and for ensuring that it sets a positive precedent for the future. 
The first question is when do the rantings of a dictator turn into a credible threat of 
crimes against humanity or genocide?  Many authoritarian leaders make threats and 
almost all do brutal things to their own people, but not many actually commit acts of 
genocide.  The rationale for the intervention in Libya is that Gaddafi somehow went 
beyond simply making threats and committing ordinary levels of brutality.  It is critical to 
know what constituted crossing this line so that future decisions about intervention can be 
made wisely.  It is also critical to know for certain that Gaddafi crossed this line and 
represented a credible threat of mass killings of his own people.  Intervening simply to 
save a few lives, or even a few hundred lives, may be an appealing humanitarian action, 
but it sets an absolutely untenable precedent.  On the other hand, if genocide or mass 
killings are likely to occur, than the rationale for intervention is much more 
urgent.  Accordingly, the powers that intervened need to have a clear understanding of 
why this threat was real in Libya which goes beyond simply quoting Gaddafi’s words. 
A second and related question is how absolute does the U.S. intend to be about these 
criteria.  Intervening to stop possible crimes against humanity in Libya raises both 
retrospective questions, such as why did the U.S. stand by and let genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 happen as well as prospective questions such as will the U.S. now intervene in all 
cases of this kind?  It is clear the U.S. cannot do this, but will probably limit its 
interventions to weaker countries whose leadership we dislike.  If the Chinese 
government, for example, violently squashed demonstrations, as they have done in the 
past, it is almost certain there would be no military response from the U.S. and the 
west.  Similarly, if the leadership of a weaker country that enjoyed more positive 
relations with the U.S. made violent threats towards demonstrators, the U.S. might not act 
the way we did in Libya.  Accordingly, this intervention will lend itself to future charges 
of American, and western, hypocrisy on human rights.  This is not, in of itself, an 
argument against the intervention, but it is an issue that must be addressed. 
A third question is if the intervention is aimed at stopping a crime against humanity 
before it occurs, when does that obligation end?  In this case, the argument for 
intervention was that if the U.S. and its allies did nothing Gaddafi would have killed 
 2 
thousands.  A no fly zone was a good way to prevent this from happening, but the U.S. 
cannot make an open-ended commitment in Libya, nor can it easily walk away after a 
few weeks of bombing.  The intervention has fundamentally shifted power relations in 
Libya.  If Gaddafi survives this, he will be significantly weakened with new groups and 
factions vying for power.  At that point, for example, simply ending the no fly zone could 
shift the balance of power back to Gaddafi.  Clearly, the U.S. must define when its 
humanitarian obligation ends.  The Obama administration seems acutely aware of the 
perils of a long engagement in Libya, but extricating the U.S. from Libya will not be 
easy; and taking sides in a complex civil war will likely create a new set of problems. 
A fourth question is to what extent are these obligations uniquely American.  Obviously, 
the enormous strength of the American military relative to any other military in the world 
suggests that the U.S. will have to play a significant role in this or any other similar 
action.  However, it is politically, militarily and economically unwise and unfeasible for 
the U.S. to always lead on these types of issues.  Thus far in Libya, the U.S. has done 
much of the military actions, but the Obama administration has been successful in 
building a real coalition thus making this a multi-lateral effort.  This has the potential to 
be a good precedent, but may not prove replicable in more complicated, difficult or 
expensive cases. 
The intervention in Libya may already have saved thousands of lives, but this is 
extremely difficult to prove.  To some extent, that is the nature of using the military to 
prevent something from happening.  If claims like these, regardless of whether or not 
they are true, are thrown around lightly with little proof and poor definitions of terms, a 
precedent will be set for the U.S. that will prove expensive and entangling in the 
future.  Moreover, if a plan for ending military action is not firmly in place, the U.S. 
could be in for another costly, dragged out, and ultimately unsuccessful involvement in 
the Middle East.  Thus, these questions must be answered before this intervention can be 
declared a success. 
